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Keeping It in the Family: The Pitfalls
of Naming a Family Member as a
Trustee
by
Richard Ausness*

I. Introduction
This article is concerned with trusts in which either the settlor, trustee, or beneficiaries are members of the same family.
For example, the settlors may be the parents,1 grandparents,2 or
other relatives3 of the trust beneficiaries. Trustees may be settlors,4 parents of the beneficiaries,5 children of the settlor,6 and
other family members,7 while beneficiaries may include either
the settlor, the settlor’s spouse, children, grandchildren, or other
* Stites & Harbison Professor of Law, University of Kentucky Rosenberg College of Law, B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968, University of Florida; LL.M. Yale
Law School. I would like to than the University of Kentucky Rosenberg College of Law for supporting this research.
1 E.g., Trolan v. Trolan, 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d 264, 268 (Ct. App. 2019); Peterson v. Peterson, 835 S.E.2d 651, 653 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019); McPherson v. McPherson, 705 S.E.2d 314, 315 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011); Rennacker v. Rennacker, 509
N.E.2d 798, 799 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Hurtig v. Gabrielson, 525 N.W.2d 612, 612
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995); In re Estate of Reugh, 447 P.2d 549 (Wash. Ct. App.
2019).
2 E.g., Rollins v. Rollins, 790 S.E.2d 157, 159 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016); Cassibry v. Cassibry, 217 So. 2d 698, 700 (Miss Ct. App. 2017); In re McDonald, 953
N.Y.S 2d 751, 753 (App. Div. 2012).
3 In re W.N. Connell & Marjorie T. Connell Living Trust, 393 P.3d 1090,
1091 (Nev. 2017) (stepfather).
4 McCormick v. McCormick, 455 N.E.2d 103, 106 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
5 E.g., Rollins, 790 S.E.2d at 159; In re Trusts for McDonald, 953 N.Y.S.
2d 751, 752 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012); Reugh, 447 P.3d at 550.
6 E.g., Peterson, 835 S.E.2d at 676; Rennacker, 509 N.E.2d at 799; Gillespie v. Seymour, 823 P.2d 782, 786 (Kan. 1991); Cassibry v. Cassibry, 217 So. 3d
298, 700 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017); In re Estate of Ternansky, 141 N.E.2d 189, 191
(Ohio Ct. App. 1957); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 480 S.E.2d 488, 489 (Va. 1997);
Kerger v. Kerger, 780 P.2d 923, 926 (Wyo. 1989).
7 Peterson, 835 S.E.2d at 676 (spouse); Rollins, 790 S.E.2d at 159;
Laubner v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 898 N.E.2d 744, 747 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MAT\34-1\MAT101.txt

2

unknown

Seq: 2

11-JUN-21

18:13

Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers

relatives of the settlor.8 These persons will be referred to as
“family members.”
Virtually all family members have disagreements with other
family members and sometimes these disagreements can destroy
relationships and even lead to bitter, long-term feuds. As the
cases discussed below will show, testamentary provisions by a deceased family member can also cause strife within a family, particularly when a long-term trust is involved. More importantly,
the chances of this happening are greatly increased when the decedent chooses a family member to serve as trustee. Some settlors are willing to take this risk because they have confidence in
the prospective trustee to administer the trust fairly or because
they believe that the cost of administering the trust will be less if
a family member serves as trustee instead of a bank or other corporate trustee. Nevertheless, a settlor should think twice about
appointing a family member as trustee. In particular, a settlor
should avoid naming a surviving spouse as sole trustee if some of
the beneficiaries are adult children from a prior marriage.
Part II of this Article discusses some of the fiduciary duties
that trustees must satisfy, including the duty of loyalty, prudence,
and impartiality, the duty to inform, and the duty to account.
Part III is concerned with special problem areas such as support
trusts, discretionary trusts, and the modification of “irrevocable”
trusts by decanting. Finally, Part IV describes a number of precautionary measures that settlors and trustees should take to reduce the chance of future conflicts within the family.

II. Duties of Trustees
A trust is a fiduciary relationship in which one or more persons (trustees) hold legal title to property for the benefit of equitable owners (beneficiaries).9 Although trust property at one
time usually consisted of real property occupied by a beneficiary,
currently it is far more likely to consist of intangible personal
property such as stocks and bonds.10 This means that trustees are
(stepmother); Cassibry, 217 So. 3d 298 (spouse); Connell Living Trust, 393 P.3d
at 1091 (stepfather); Rowe v. Rowe, 347 P. 2d 968, 970 (Or. 1959) (cousin).
8 Rollins, 790 S.E.2d at 159 (brother).
9 GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 1 at 1 (6th ed. 1987).
10 John H. Langbein,The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105
YALE L.J. 625, 637-38 (1995).
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no longer mere titleholders of trust property, but instead they
must be active managers as well. Furthermore, to carry out these
increased managerial responsibilities, trustees are usually given
more discretion than was typical in the past.11
Trustees are fiduciaries and, thus, are subject to a variety of
fiduciary duties for the protection of trust beneficiaries. The
most important of these duties are the duties of loyalty, prudence, and impartiality.12 In addition, trustees who exercise discretion must act in good faith and in the best interests of the trust
beneficiaries.13 Unfortunately, family members who serve as
trustees often either are not aware of these fiduciary duties or
choose to ignore them. If a serious breach of duty occurs, litigation may ensue causing the trustee to be removed or subjected to
a surcharge by the court.
A. The Duty of Loyalty
One of the most important fiduciary duties is that of loyalty
which means that the trustee must avoid self-dealing or conflicts
of interest. This is true even when the trustee is also a family
member and a beneficiary under the trust.14
1. Self-Dealing
Self-dealing occurs when a fiduciary engages in a transaction
involving individually owned property of the trust or the property of the trustee. This includes the sale or leasing15 of trust
property to the trustee, the borrowing of trust property by the
trustee, and the sale of the trustee’s property to the trust.16 Selfdealing may be a problem when both the trust and trustee own
shares in a family-run business.
11

Richard C. Ausness, Discretionary Trusts: An Update, 43 ACTEC L.J.
231, 231 (2018).
12 Louise Lark Hill, Fiduciary Duties and Exculpatory Clauses: Clash of
the Titans or Cozy Bedfellows?, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 832, 832 (2012).
13 Sully v. Sully, 76 N.W.2d 239, 245 (Neb. 1956).
14 E.g., Peterson, 835 S.E.2d at 670; Rennacker, 509 N.E.2d at 715; Cassibry, 217 So. 3d at 709 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).
15 Estate of Stevenson, 605 N.W.2d 818, 822 (S.D. 2000).
16 Stegmier v. Magness, 728 A.2d 557 (Del. 1999); Keye v. Gautier, 684
So. 2d 210, 211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Estate of Schulman, 568 N.Y.S.2d
660, 663 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
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When self-dealing occurs, the transaction cannot be an arm’s
length one because the trustee is both the buyer and the seller.
Therefore, self-dealing is subject to a “no further inquiry” rule
which allows the settlor or the trust’s beneficiaries to void the
transaction even though the trustee acted reasonably and in good
faith.17 Although, the settlor may waive these requirements either expressly or by implication,18 the trustee must still act in
good faith and in the best interests of the beneficiaries.19
Stegemeier v. Magness20 illustrates these principles. In that
case, the settlor appointed his brother, Donald, to be the trustee
of two testamentary trusts established in his will.21 The settlor’s
widow, Anne, was named as the beneficiary of the first trust as
well as the income beneficiary of the second or residuary trust.22
The corpus of the second trust was to be divided among the settlor’s six daughters at Anne’s death.23 Three of the daughters
were also Anne’s children and the other three were daughters of
the settlor by a prior marriage.24 The residuary trust’s assets included certain property in a real estate development known as
Harmony Crest. The property was subject to a power of sale held
by Charles Allmond and Anne Magness who were the co-administrators of the settlor’s estate.25
In 1982, Donald and Anne formed a corporation, Magness
Builders, to obtain construction loans to develop the Harmony
Crest property.26 Donald owned 51% of the new corporation’s
stock and Anne owned 49%.27 Over the next few years, Charles
17 Vrendenburgh v. Jones, 349 A.2d 22, 33 (Del. Ch. 1975); Melanie B.
Leslie, In Defense of the No Further Inquiry Rule: A Response to Professor John
Langbein, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 541, 545 (2005); but see In re Thomas, 311
A.2d 112, 114 (Del. 1973) (finding no self-dealing when a partnership of which
the trustee was a member exercised a pre-existing option to purchase trustowned land).
18 Huntington Nat’l Bank v. Wolfe, 651 N.E.2d 458, 464 (Ohio Ct. App.
1994).
19 Cassibry, 217 So. 3d at 707.
20 Stegmier, 728 A.2d 557.
21 Id. at 559.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 559.
26 Id. at 560.
27 Id.
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and Anne exercised their power of sale to transfer all of the Harmony Crest property to Magness Builders who then constructed
homes on the property and sold them to third parties.28 In 1993,
two of the residuary trust’s remainder beneficiaries, Susane
Stegemeier and Diane Mulrooney, brought suit against Charles,
Anne, and Donald for breach of their fiduciary duties.29 The
trial court held in favor of the defendants and Susane and Diane
appealed.30
The principal question before the appeals court was whether
the standard applicable to a corporate fiduciary should be applied or whether the higher standard applicable to a trustee was
more appropriate.31 Under the former rule, self-dealing by a corporate director was permitted if a majority of the other directors
approved.32 However, the court held that the corporate fiduciary
standard was not applicable to trustees.33 Instead, it declared
that the defendants had engaged in self-dealing by Harmony
Crest selling the trust’s property to Magness Builders without informing the remainder beneficiaries of the trust and without obtaining their permission.34 The court remanded the case back to
the lower court to determine if the trust had received a fair price
from Magness Builders for the property.35 If the trust did not
receive a fair price, the defendants would have to pay the difference between a fair price and the price actually received by the
trust.36
Cassibry v. Cassibry provides a somewhat more complicated
example of self-dealing.37 In that case, Napoleon LePoint Cassibry, Jr. died in 1998, survived by his wife, June, and his three
sons, Napoleon, Graham, and John.38 In his will, Napoleon, Jr.
created a Family Trust funded by stock in the Cleveland State
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Id.
Id.
Id. at 562.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 564-65.
Id. at 566-67.
Id.
217 So. 3d 698.
Id. at 700.
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Bank (CSB) and a half-interest in the family home.39 Napoleon
Jr’s son, also named Napoleon, was named as trustee.40 The trust
was created primarily for the benefit of June, but Napoleon was
also authorized to pay such income to himself and his brothers or
their issue that he deemed advisable for their “maintenance,
health and education” and at June’s death to transfer any remaining trust assets in equal shares to himself and his two
brothers.41
In 1999, June established the Cassibry Children Irrevocable
Trust (Children’s Trust), whose beneficiaries were Napoleon,
John, and Graham, and appointed Napoleon as trustee.42 The
Children’s Trust was created to avoid potential estate taxes and
to protect against lawsuits brought by John’s ex-wives.43 The
Children’s Trust provided that Napoleon as trustee had the discretion to pay any amount of income or principal as he deemed
advisable for the health, education, maintenance, support, or
comfort of any beneficiary.44 June subsequently created another
trust, know as the June C. Cassibry Irrevocable Trust (JCC Trust)
to receive certain life insurance proceeds at her death.45 Napoleon, John, and Graham were named as beneficiaries and Napoleon was appointed as trustee.46
In 2004, Napoleon purchased 20,000 shares of Paragon stock
in his own name and he and John formed a partnership, CBP, to
purchase another 20,000 shares of Paragon stock.47 To purchase
these shares, Napoleon obtained a $200,000 personal line of
credit at CSB and a $200,000 line of credit from the Family
Trust.48 These lines of credit were secured by shares of CSB stock
held by the Children’s Trust and the Family Trust along with
other bank stock and the life insurance contract owned by the
39

Id.
Id. To avoid any confusion with the French Emperor of the same
name. I will not refer to the son of Napoleon, Jr. as Napoleon III, but instead I
will simply call him Napoleon.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 701.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
40
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JCC Trust.49 Napoleon also withdrew $190,000 from the Family
Trust’s checking account and apparently deposited some of it
into his personal account.50
Unfortunately for Napoleon and John, the value of the Paragon stock fell sharply in 2007 so Napoleon was forced to sell the
CSB stock that was used as collateral to purchase the Paragon
stock.51 Since Graham had not participated in the Paragon stock
purchase, Napoleon and John had to distribute one-third of the
Children’s Trust CSB stock to him.52 Napoleon also sold June’s
home and purchased a condominium for her with the proceeds.53
When June died in 2008, Napoleon used the insurance proceeds
that were paid into the JCC Trust to pay off the debts associated
with the Paragon stock purchase even though the JCC Trust did
not authorize this action.54
In 2009, Graham sued Napoleon claiming that he had
breached his fiduciary duty as trustee of the three trusts and had
misappropriated assets from the trusts to borrow money personally to finance the purchase of the Paragon stock.55 The chancery court ordered an accounting which concluded that Napoleon
had withdrawn a total of $426,373 from his parents’ estates.56
After a bench trial, the court declared that Napoleon’s cash withdrawals and loans for his personal benefit were a “blatant example of breach of fiduciary duty” and ordered him to pay Graham
7,757 shares of Paragon stock, $109,190 from the JCC Trust, and
an additional damage award of $143,665.57 The lower court also
awarded John $109,190 from the JCC Trust.58
On appeal, the appellate court concluded that Napoleon’s
“loans” to himself from the Children’s Trust constituted a breach
of the duty of loyalty even though the trust allowed the trustee to
make loans to trust beneficiaries.59 Citing the Restatement of
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 701-02.
at 702.

at 703.
at 704-05.
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Trusts,60 the court declared that “[e]ven express authorization to
engage in transactions otherwise prohibited under a trustee’s
duty of loyalty does not ‘completely dispense with the trustee’s
underlying fiduciary responsibility to act in the interests of the
beneficiaries and to exercise prudence in administering the
trust.’ ”61 Accordingly, the appeals court affirmed the lower
court’s damage award against Napoleon.62
As mentioned earlier, the settlor may allow a trustee to engage in self-dealing. However, courts tend to interpret such
waivers strictly. Trustees who are family members should avoid
self-dealing at all costs no matter how much they think that their
actions are proper and consistent with the settlor’s wishes. Even
if the trustee ultimately prevails, the litigation triggered by selfdealing is certain to be costly to the trust and damaging to family
relations.
2. Conflicts of Interest
The duty of loyalty also requires trustees and other fiduciaries to avoid conflicts of interest. Furthermore, it is not necessary
to show that the fiduciary’s actions were actually affected by a
conflict of interest; rather, it is enough to show that the fiduciary
allowed himself to be placed in a position where his interests
might conflict with the interests of the trust beneficiaries.63 The
reason for this is obvious. As Professor George Bogert observed
many years ago:
It is a well-known quality of human nature that it is extremely
difficult, or perhaps impossibly, for an individual to act fairly in the
interests of others whom he represents and at the same time to consider his own financial advantage. In most cases, consciously or unconsciously, he will tend to make a choice which is favorable to
himself, regardless of its effect on those for whom he is supposed to be
acting.64

Notwithstanding this pessimistic view of human nature, settlors often create “structural” conflicts of interest by appointing
family members as trustee who are either beneficiaries them60
61
62
63
64

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. c (2) (2007).
Cassibry, 217 So. 3d at 707.
Id. at 709.
Bloodworth v. Bloodworth, 579 S.E.2d 858, 862 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
BOGERT, supra note 9, § 95 at 342.
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selves or who have business relationships that may involve conflicts of interest.65 For example, in Huntington National Bank v.
Wolfe, the settlor named his brother, John, as co-trustee of a trust
the primary asset of which was stock in a closely held corporation
that employed him.66 When the trustees decided to sell some of
the company’s stock back to the company rather than distributing it in kind to one of the beneficiaries, the court upheld their
decision, declaring that “[t]he settlor must have understood that
his Co-Trustee [John] would take into consideration the interests
of the corporation as well as the interest of the beneficiary in
making any decisions concerning the family corporation’s stock
held by the Trusts.”67 Even though John was eventually vindicated, the impact of this litigation on the family must have been
devastating.
Peterson v. Peterson provides a more recent example of a
structural conflict of interest.68 Charles Peterson died in 1994,
survived by his wife, Mary, and his three sons, Alex, David, and
Calhoun.69 In his will, Charles established a marital trust and a
residual “by-pass” trust and named Mary and the children cotrustees of the trusts.70 The marital trust provided that Mary
should receive all of the income from the trust during her lifetime; in addition, she was given a general power of appointment
over the trust property.71 Any property remaining in the marital
trust at Mary’s death was to be added to the by-pass trust.72 In
addition, the trustees were authorized to invade the corpus of the
by-pass trust to provide for Mary’s comfortable support and for
the proper support and education of the settlor’s descendants.73
In 2016, Mary demanded that the trustees turn over all of
the property in the marital trust to her and also required all of
the assets of the by-pass trust to be transferred to Calhoun.74
When Alex and David refused, Mary sued to terminate the trusts
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Langbein, supra note 10, at 665.
651 N.E.2d 458 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 462.
835 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
Id. at 653.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 654.
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and force them to make the transfers, while Calhoun sued to
have them removed as trustees.75 The trial court granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims and ordered Alex and
David to be removed as trustees if they did not agree to transfer
the trusts’ assets to Mary and Calhoun.76 However, the appeals
court reversed, holding that the exercise of Mary’s power of appointment to transfer trust assets was not absolute, but was subject to her fiduciary duties as a trustee.77 According to the court,
allowing Mary to transfer the trusts’ assets to herself and Calhoun would conflict with the settlor’s intent that the trust property be used to provide support for all of his children.78 In other
words, she put her own interests ahead of those of the trust and
the other beneficiaries of the trust.
B. The Duty of Prudence
The duty of prudence covers the management and investment of trust property. This includes the duty to make such
property productive as well as the duty to diversify and otherwise
invest trust assets in a prudent manner. Presently, it takes a high
degree of expertise to satisfy the duty of prudence when the trust
is largely made up of common stocks.
Unless directed otherwise, the trustee should remove unproductive property from the trust. Unproductive property includes
property that produces little or no income even though it may be
appreciating in value.79 The same principle also applies to the
retention of underproductive property.80
75

Id.
Id.
77 Id. at 655.
78 Id.
79 For example, property such as gold coins or Dutch Masters paintings
may increase significantly in value, thereby benefitting remainder beneficiaries,
but provide no income for income beneficiaries. One way to avoid this problem
is to employ the “unitrust” concept in which the share of income beneficiaries is
calculated in terms of a percentage of the trust corpus each year. WILLIAM M.
MCGOVERN, SHELDON F. KURTZ & DAVID M. ENGLISH, WILL, TRUSTS AND
ESTATES § 9.6 at 401 (4th ed. 2010).
80 Rutanen v. Ballard, 678 N.E.2d 133, 138 (Mass. 1997); but see Champagne v. Champagne, 734 A.2d 1048, 1050-51 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999).
76
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1. Retention of Unproductive and Underproductive
Property
Family members who assume the office of trustee sometimes
falsely assume that it is safe to retain the settlor’s existing portfolio. However, unlike the settlor, the new trustee is required by
the duty of prudence to dispose of unproductive or underproductive property as soon as is reasonably possible. For example,
failure to make trust property productive resulted in liability in
Witmer v. Blair, notwithstanding the fact that the settlor’s niece
received no compensation for serving as trustee and acted in
good faith.81 In that case, the settlor Henry Nussbaum appointed
his niece, Jane Ann Blair, as trustee of a testamentary trust to
provide for the college education of the children of his daughter,
Dorothy Janice Witmer, living at the time of his death.82 If no
child survived (or failed to pursue a college education), the trust
was to revert to Henry’s daughter, Dorothy Janice Witmer.83
When Henry died in 1960, his only granddaughter, Marguerite,
was seven years old.84 Later, Marguerite and other trust beneficiaries filed suit against Jane Ann seeking and accounting and
her removal as the trustee, as well as an award of actual and
punitive damages, claiming that she had breached her fiduciary
duties.85 The lower court ordered an accounting and the removal
of Jane Ann as trustee, but refused to award damages for breach
of fiduciary duties.86
On appeal, the appellate court found that Jane Ann had
failed to make the trust property productive.87 Between 1962
and 1971, Jane Ann had kept all the trust assets in a checking
account and a savings account that paid only 1/2% interest.88 In
light of the fact that Marguerite would not be ready for college
for several years, the court concluded that Jane Ann should have
invested the trust assets in certificates of deposit or other invest81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

588 S.W.2d 222, 225 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 222.
Id.
Id. at 225.
Id.
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ments that would have provided a better rate of return.89 Relying on the testimony at trial of an accountant, the court
determined that the trust would have earned an additional $2840
between 1962 and 1971 (when Marguerite might have needed
money for college expenses) if Jane Ann had invested most of
the trust’s assets in one-year certificates of deposit.90 Therefore,
it found that Jane Ann had failed to make the trust property
profitable and remanded the case back to the lower court with
instructions to award the plaintiffs $2,840 in damages.
2. Failure to Make Prudent Investments
For more than one hundred and fifty years, the “prudent
man” rule, which first appeared in Harvard College v. Amory,91
was the principal standard governing investment choices by private trustees.92 The Harvard College case involved the power of
the trustee to invest in the stock of companies engaged in manufacturing and insurance.93 In that case, the court upheld the right
of the trustees to do so, declaring that that trustees should “observe how men of prudence, discretion, and intelligence manage
their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to
the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the capital invested.”94 This formulation focused on the avoidance of loss
rather than on the maximization of return.95
This traditional “prudent man” rule was widely criticized
during the latter half of the twentieth century96 and eventually
89

Id.
Id.
91 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
92 Jerold I. Horn, Prudent Investor Rule, Modern Portfolio Theory, and
Private Trusts: Drafting and Administration Including the “Give-Me-Five” Unitrust, 33 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. 1, 3 (1998).
93 Paul G. Haskill, The Prudent Person Rule for Trustee Investment and
Modern Portfolio Theory, 69 N.C. L. REV. 87, 88 (1990). The rule in England at
that time limited investment to government bonds and real estate. Id.
94 Harvard College, 26 Mass. at 461.
95 Loren C. Ipsen, Trends in the Liability of Corporate Fiduciaries, 24
IDAHO L. REV. 443, 443 (1988).
96 According to these critics, the prudent man rule, as interpreted by
many courts, was deficient because it tended to focus upon the performance of
each asset in isolation rather than on the performance of the portfolio as a
whole, it focused on the nominal value of the trust corpus and ignored the effect
90
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replaced by such alternatives as the Uniform Prudent Investor
Act, Third Restatement of Trusts, and the Uniform Trust Code,
which incorporated modern portfolio theory and other financial
concepts.97 According to modern portfolio theory, a particular
investment that might seem to involve excessive risk viewed in
isolation, may actually reduce overall risk to the portfolio and,
therefore, be a more prudent investment.98 In other words, portfolio theory tries to correlate expected risk and return in order to
identify an optimal portfolio that will produce the highest return
for a given risk.99
In re Estate of Collins100 represents an extreme example of a
trustee’s failure to exercise prudence with respect to the selection
of investments. Although the trustees in Collins were business
associates rather than family members, the principles set forth by
the court in that case are applicable to trustees in general. When
the settlor, Ralph Collins, died in 1963, he established a testamentary trust for the benefit of his wife and children and named
a business partner, Carl Lamb, and his attorney, C.E. Millikan, as
trustees.101 The trust principal was $80,000.
Two clients of Millikan, Downing, and Ward, wanted to borrow $50,000 to develop some property that they owned and
Lamb and Millikan agreed to loan them the money on behalf of
the trust.102 The loan was secured by a second mortgage on 9.38
acres of unimproved property in San Bernardino County as well
as by 20% of the stock in Downing and Ward’s company.103 Unfortunately, the building boom in the area burst and the company, as well as Downing and Ward, went bankrupt.104 In
of inflation on the purchasing power of money. The rule also prohibited certain
classes in investments entirely, while providing a safe harbor for other types of
investment. In addition, it discouraged trustees from delegating certain management responsibilities and also deterred them from considering new types of
investment products. Horn, supra note 92, at 7.
97 Edward C. Hallbach, Jr., Trust Investment Law in the Third Restatement, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1151, 1159-63 (1992).
98 Ipsen, supra note 95, at 450.
99 Id.
100 139 Cal. Rept. 644 (Ct. App. 1977).
101 Id. at 646.
102 Id. at 647.
103 Id.
104 Id.
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addition, the holder of the first mortgage foreclosed, effectively
destroying the security of the second mortgage.105
In 1973, when Lamb and Millikan sought to be discharged as
trustees (having reduced the trust’s principal to almost nothing),
the beneficiaries sought to have them surcharged for the loss sustained by the trust as the result of their imprudent investments.106 The trial court discharged the trustees and the
beneficiaries appealed.107 The appellate court reversed, finding
that the trustees had failed to follow the prudent person standard
by investing two-thirds of the trust principal in one investment
and by investing in real property secured by only a second mortgage.108 The court also determined that the trustees had failed
to make an adequate investigation of either the borrowers or the
collateral.109 Specifically, the court found that the trustees failed
to discover that at the time the loan was made, there were six
notices of default and three lawsuits pending against Downing
and Ward.110 In addition, they did not have the property in question appraised but instead relied on a statement by a real estate
broker that property in the area was currently selling for $18,000
to $20,000 an acre.111 Finally, they failed to secure possession of
or earmark the company stock that was supposed to provide
backup security for the loan.112 Consequently, the appeals court
remanded the case back to the trial court with instructions to
surcharge the trustees.113
The duty of prudence also requires a trustee to avoid speculative investments,114 to monitor the performance of trust investments and to reduce industry and firm risk by diversification. As
far as choosing investments is concerned, the trustee should invest trust assets with the care, skill, and caution of a prudent in105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id.
Id. at 646.
Id.
Id. at 648.
Id.
Id. at 647.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 650.
But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF

TRUSTS § 90 cmt. e (2007).
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vestor.115 In many cases, this may require the services of a
professional financial advisor or investment manager.
3. Failure to Diversify Investments
According to modern portfolio theory, a prudent investor
will try to minimize inherent risks and avoid “uncompensated”
risks. Uncompensated risks are those associated with a particular firm or a market sector. Unlike market risk, these risks can
be avoided by diversification. Although the duty to diversify
may be waived by the settlor, as the Mueller case116 illustrates,
this does not relieve the trustee of the duty to act prudently. In
Mueller, L.J. Mueller, the sole stockholder of the L.J. Mueller
Furnace Company, died in 1931. In his will, L.J. Mueller created
two trusts funded by shares of Mueller Company stock.117 The
first trust provided that income would go to Mueller’s widow,
Jean, for life with a remainder to his children, Robert and Elizabeth.118 A second trust was created for the benefit of Ruth
Mueller and Patricia Maslowski, two children of Mueller’s deceased son.119 Another son, Harold, received a substantial
amount of Mueller Company stock outright.120 Jean and Harold
were named as co-trustees of both trusts.121
In 1938, Harold put some of his Mueller Company stock into
an inter vivos trust and named himself as trustee.122 Under the
terms of the trust, Jean was to receive the income for life and
Robert and Elizabeth were named as the remainder beneficiaries.123 In 1954, the Mueller Company was acquired by the
Worthington Corporation and the Mueller Company stock in all
three trusts was exchanged for Worthington Company stock.124
115 Bryon W. Harmon & Laura A. Fisher, The Prudence of Passivity: An
Argument for Default Passive Management in Trust Investing, 44 ACTEC L.J.
147, 153 (2019).
116 In re Trust Created Under the Last Will and Testament of L.J. Mueller,
135 N.W.2d 854 (Wis. 1965).
117 Id. at 857.
118 Id.
119 Id
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
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In 1958, the county court approved the accounts of the trustees
of the two testamentary trusts.125 However, when the trustees
sought court approval in 1962 for their accounts, some of the
trust beneficiaries objected, claiming that the trustees should
have diversified the trust assets by selling the Worthington Company stock no later than November 1961.126
The lower court ruled that the trustees should be surcharged
for failing to sell the Worthington stock within a reasonable time
and this was affirmed on appeal.127 The court observed that Harold served as a director of the Worthington company and knew
that it, along with a number of other electrical companies, was
about to be sued by the United States for antitrust violations.128
In addition, Harold knew that Worthington was in a profit
squeeze.129 Furthermore, Harold sold much of his own Worthington Company stock during this period when it lost half of its
value.130 On the other hand, Harold in his capacity as trustee
failed to sell any of the Worthington Company stock owned by
the three trusts until 1963.131 Consequently, the court concluded
that Harold and Jean must reimburse the two testamentary trusts
$147,000 and the inter vivos trust $100,000.132
As the Mueller case illustrates, trustees often inherit a trust
with an unbalanced portfolio.133 In such cases, the trustee must
take steps to diversify the trust portfolio within a reasonable
time.134 Sometimes a settlor will insert a retention clause in the
trust that authorizes the trustee to retain the assets in the original
portfolio even though the resulting portfolio is seriously unbalanced.135 However, as Wood v. U.S. Bank suggests, courts tend
125

Id.
Id. at 858.
127 Id. at 864.
128 Id. at 862.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 857-58. The trial court had ruled that Harold would have to indemnify Jean for any damages that she had to pay to the trusts, but the appellate court reversed and held that she was equally responsible. Id. at 866-67.
133 In re Estate of Janes, 681 N.E.2d 332 (N.Y. 1997).
134 Id. at 339.
135 In some cases, the settlor may even mandate that particular assets be
retained. Even then, the trustee may be required to request a court to modify
126
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to interpret retention clauses narrowly, particularly when the asset in question is the stock of a corporate trustee.136 In that case,
the settlor created an inter vivos trust with himself as trustee for
the benefit of his wife, Dana.137 Firstar Bank became the trustee
at the settlor’s death.138 At that time, approximately 80% of the
trust principal consisted of Firstar stock.139 However, a retention
clause was added by the settlor which allowed the trust to retain
the trustee’s corporate stock.140 Unfortunately, the Firstar stock
declined substantially in value and Dana sued the trustee for failure to diversify.141 On appeal, the court held that the retention
clause did not relieve the trustee of its duty to diversify, but
merely waived the trustee’s conflict of interest in retaining its
own stock in the trust.142 Therefore, the court concluded, the
trustee was still required to sell the Firstar stock as soon as it
reasonably could.143
C. The Duty of Impartiality
The duty of impartiality requires a trustee to treat each beneficiary fairly.144 Impartiality concerns can arise with respect to
investment decisions as well as distribution decisions by a trustee.
For example, intergenerational conflicts often occur between the
investment goals of income beneficiaries and remainder beneficiaries. In addition, conflicts may arise among beneficiaries of
the same generation who may be subject to divergent financial
needs and circumstances. Finally, the duty of impartiality may
also be a factor where distributions are concerned. For example,
disagreements may be present over distribution decisions with
respect to sprinkle or spray trusts. Impartiality may also be an
issue when the trustee exercises a power to invade the corpus of
the trust if changed circumstances have made continued retention of the asset
inconsistent with the duty of prudence. In re Pulitzer, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (Sur. 1931),
aff’d mem., 260 N.Y.S. 975 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932).
136 828 N.E.2d 1072 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
137 Id. at 1074.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1074-75.
141 Id. at 874.
142 Id. at 1077-78.
143 Id. at 1080.
144 Hearst v. Ganzi, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 473, 481 (Ct. App. 2006).
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the trust for his own benefit, thereby reducing the assets available for other beneficiaries145.
A potential violation of the duty of impartiality arises when
the trustee is also a beneficiary. A common example of this is
when the surviving spouse is the income beneficiary and children
from a prior marriage of the settlor are remainder beneficiaries.
For example, in Carter v. Carter, the settlor, Luther Carter, created an inter vivos trust and named himself as trustee.146 When
Luther died in 2003, the trust was divided into three smaller
trusts, including a marital trust for the benefit of Luther’s wife,
Audrey, and his daughter, Tiffany.147 Audrey was appointed
trustee of the marital trust and was the sole income beneficiary,
while Tiffany was the remainder beneficiary.148 It was undisputed that Audrey, in her capacity as trustee, invested the entire
trust corpus in tax-free municipal bonds.149 Tiffany brought suit
against her stepmother, claiming that her investment strategy
failed to protect the corpus of the trust from being reduced because of inflation.150
The lower court ruled in favor of Audrey.151 On appeal, Tiffany argued that Audrey had a duty to treat all beneficiaries impartially without favoring her own interests.152 However, relying
on the language of the original trust (which provided for and described the provisions of the marital trust), the appellate court
concluded that the settlor intended for the marital trust to generate income during Audrey’s lifetime any way that she deemed
appropriate.153 In other words, Luther had waived the duty of
impartiality insofar as protecting Tiffany’s interest against inflation was concerned.
145 See, e.g., Rachins v. Minassian, 251 So. 2d 919, 920 (Fla. D.C.A. 2018);
see also Joel C. Dobris, Ethical Problems for Lawyers upon Trust Termination:
Conflicts of Interest, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 57 n. 311 (1983).
146 965 N.E.2d 1146, 1148 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
147 Id. at 1149.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 1149-50.
152 Id. at 1155.
153 Id. at 1155-56.
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However, the trustee in Cooper v. Cooper was not so
lucky.154 Unfortunately for him, there was no language in the
trust authorizing the income beneficiary to maximize income. In
that case, De Anne Cooper, who died in 1978, provided in her
will that certain property be held in trust during her husband’s
lifetime.155 The husband, Fermore (Bert) Cooper, and the Old
National Bank (ONB) were named as co-trustees.156 After
Fermore died, the trust corpus was to be divided between the
couple’s two children, Joyce and Richard.157 Joyce subsequently
petitioned the lower court to remove her father as trustee and to
order an accounting.158 After an accounting was filed, the court
found that Fermore had “maintained a policy of investment . . .
which maximized the income of the estate . . . to the detriment of
the growth of the corpus of the estate.”159 It ordered Fermore to
pay $342,493, which it estimated to be the loss to the remainder
interest.160
On appeal, the appeals court evaluated Fermore’s investment decisions from the perspective of the prudent investor rule
rather than as a breach of the duty of impartiality.161 According
to the court, only 13% of the trust’s marketable securities were
made up of common stocks, while 87% of its assets consisted of
bonds and bond equivalents.162 Furthermore, during the period
in question, the purchasing power of the trust’s corpus decreased
about 4% per year.163 The court declared that the prudent investor standard requires to trustee to maintain a balance between
the rights of the income beneficiary and the remainder beneficiaries.164 Agreeing with the trial court that Fermore failed to
satisfy this standard, the appeals court upheld the lower court’s
damage award.165
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165

913 P.2d 393 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 395.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 397.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 398.
Id.
Id.
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Fortunately, there are a number of techniques that can be
employed in most states to enable trustees to maximize total return without violating the duty of impartiality. The oldest is the
principle of equitable adjustment, which is illustrated by the case
of In re Kuehn.166 Max Kuehn died in 1957, leaving a widow,
Nell, and two sons, Carter and Max, Jr.167 According to the
terms of Max’s will, certain property, including an interest in a
farm located near Sioux Fall, South Dakota, was placed in trust.
Carter and Max, Jr. were the income beneficiaries of this trust.168
At the death of Max’s two sons and their widows, the trust would
terminate and be distributed to the lineal descendants of the
sons, and if there were none, to certain charities.169
Carter died in 1960 and his interest in the trust went to Max,
Jr. When Max, Jr. died in 1971, Nell and Max’s daughter became
the income beneficiaries of the trust.170 In 1973, the trustee determined that the farm had become underproductive because of
its increase in value and sold it.171 Shortly thereafter, a dispute
arose between the income beneficiaries and the charities over the
distribution of the proceeds of the sale.172 At trial, the court
adopted a formula proposed by the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts § 241 and allocated a share of the proceeds to the income
beneficiaries.173 This application of equitable adjustment was affirmed on appeal.174
A more proactive approach is to employ the unitrust concept. Under this concept, the settlor provides that the income
beneficiaries are entitled to a certain percentage of the value of
the trust corpus instead of the income generated by the trust.175
This enables the trustee to invest in assets like land or growth
stocks that appreciate in value, even though they do not gener166

308 N.W.2d 398 (S.D. 1981).
Id. at 399.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 400.
174 Id. at 401.
175 Joel C. Dobris, Why Five? The Strange, Magnetic, and Mesmerizing
Affect of the Five Percent Unitrust and Spending Rate on Settlors, their Advisors,
and Retirees, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 39, 42 (2005).
167
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ate much income without prejudicing the interests of the income
beneficiaries.
D. Administrative Duties
In the absence of a waiver by the settlor, trustees are subject
to a variety of duties associated with trust administration. Family
members who serve as trustees are often unaware of these duties
and assume that trust beneficiaries will not object if they fail to
observe them strictly. However, family members who serve as
trustees should be aware of the duty to earmark, the duty not to
commingle, the duty not to delegate, the duty to keep accurate
records, the duty to inform, and the duty to account.176 The trustee in Jimenez v. Lee managed to violate almost all of these duties.177 In that case, the plaintiff’s grandmother and one of the
trustee’s clients gave her father a sum of money to be used for his
children’s education.178 The father, as “custodian” for his children, subsequently used the money to purchase bank stock.179
When his daughter found about the bank stock, she sued her father for an accounting.180 The Oregon Supreme Court concluded
that the gifts were made in trust for the benefit of each child’s
education and further determined that the father held the property in trust.181 Consequently, he violated various fiduciary duties by failing to earmark the funds as trust property,
commingling the funds of the various beneficiaries, failing to
keep accurate records, failing to inform his daughter of the existence and value of the trust, and failing to provide a proper accounting. The court imposed a constructive trust on the bank
stock and refused to credit the defendant with most of the expenses he claimed because they were not supported by adequate
records.182
Two of these duties, the duty to account and the duty to inform, can present particular problems for trustees who are also
176 Scott Bieber, Trustee’s Duties Extend to Remainder Beneficiaries Too,
38 EST. PLAN. 23, 23-24 (Nov. 2011).
177 547 P.2d 126 (Or. 1976).
178 Id. at 128.
179 Id.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 128-29.
182 Id. at 130-32.

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MAT\34-1\MAT101.txt

22

unknown

Seq: 22

11-JUN-21

18:13

Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers

family members.183 Ordinarily, a trustee is required to keep and
render a full and accurate record and accounting to the beneficiary and this duty is strictly enforced by the courts.184 As Raak v.
Raak185 illustrates, a provision in the trust instrument that relieved the trustees from the duty to keep formal accounts did not
relieve them of their duty to account for trust assets in court. In
1983, Berdena Raak created a revocable inter vivos trust and appointed her children as trustees.186 At that time, the trust principal was almost $105,000.187 In 1984, Berdena revoked the trust
and requested the probate court to appoint a conservator.188
When the trustees returned less than $33,000 to the conservator,
Berdena asked the court to order the trustees to render an accounting to determine the location of the missing assets.189
The trustees relied upon language in the trust instrument
that purported to relieve them of the duty to keep accounts as
long as Berdena was alive.190 However, affirming the decision of
the lower court, the appeals court declared that while this may
have relieved the trustees from the need to keep formal accounts,
it did not relieve them of their duty to account when required to
do so by the probate court.191
The Uniform Trust Code provides that “[a] trustee shall
keep the qualified beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed
about the administration of the trust and of the material facts
necessary for them to protect their interests.”192 The UTC also
declares that the trustee should also promptly respond to a request from a beneficiary for information related to the administration of the trust.193 The duty to inform is illustrated by Wilson
v. Wilson, decided by a North Carolina intermediate appellate
court in 2010.194 In that case, Lawrence Wilson, Jr. created irrev183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813.
Raak v. Raak, 428 N.W.2d 778, 779 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 778.
Id. at 778.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 778-79.
Id. at 779.
Id. at 781.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813 (1) (Unif. Law Comm’n 2010).
Id.
690 S.E.2d 710 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
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ocable inter vivos trusts for each of his two children in 1992 and
named his father, Lawrence Wilson, Sr., as trustee for both
trusts.195 In 2007, the trust beneficiaries filed suit against Lawrence, Sr., alleging breach of fiduciary duty.196
According to the plaintiffs, their grandfather, the trustee,
had allowed their father, the settlor, to take control of the trust
and enabled him to invest the trust assets in highly speculative
personal business ventures.197 In addition, the plaintiffs claimed
that the trustee had failed to distribute income from the trust to
them as required by the trust instrument.198 Accordingly, the
plaintiffs requested the court to order the trustee to provide a
full and accurate accounting of the trusts from 1992 until the present date.199 The plaintiffs appealed after the lower court
granted summary judgment and issued a protective order in
favor of the trustee.200
On appeal, the appellate court observed that the settlor had
waived the trustee’s statutory obligation to provide information
to the trust beneficiaries.201 However, the court also declared
that a statutory provision based on the Uniform Trust Code
stated that the trustee had a mandatory duty “to act in good faith
and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and
the interests of the beneficiaries.”202 Accordingly, it ruled that
the trustee was required to disclose the information sought by
the plaintiffs because it was reasonably necessary to enable them
to enforce their rights under the trust.203

III. Special Issues
There are many circumstances where trustees must be especially careful in their administration and distribution of trust assets. Among these are support trusts, discretionary trusts, and
modification of trust provisions by means of decanting.
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203

Id. at 711.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 712.
Id. at 714.
Id.
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A. Support Trusts
In a support trust, the trustee is directed to disburse funds
from trust income or principal that is sufficient to provide for a
beneficiary’s “comfortable maintenance and support.” If the
provision is mandatory, the beneficiary’s current standard of living usually determines the amount of support to which the beneficiary is entitled. Unfortunately, as Laubner v. J.P. Morgan
Chase Bank204 illustrates, the trustee and the beneficiaries may
not always agree on what constitutes conformable maintenance
and support, particularly if the trustee is given considerable discretion in the matter.
In Laubner, William Alley created an irrevocable inter vivos
trust in 1994 for the benefit of his four daughters.205 After William died in 1996, the trust was divided into four separate
trusts—one for each daughter.206 William’s widow, Deborah, the
daughters’ stepmother, and J.P. Morgan were named as co-trustees,207 The 1994 trust directed the trustees to pay so much of the
net income as they deemed advisable for the proper care, support, maintenance, or education of each daughter or her issue.208
After William’s death, the trustees adopted a distribution
formula that distributed $11,500 per month to each of the daughters.209 This amounted to about 3.5% of the trust principal.210 In
2007, two of William’s daughters, Patricia and Pamela, sued to
increase distributions from their trusts to $18,000 per month or
5% of the value of the trust principal from the non-GST trusts.211
Patricia and Pamela also sought to remove their stepmother as
trustee.212
The plaintiffs alleged that the trustees had abused their discretion by favoring the remainder beneficiaries instead of focus204

898 N.E.2d 744 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
Id. at 747.
206 Id. Each trust was further divided into two GST Exempt trusts and a
GST Nonexempt trust. Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 748.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. The idea was to exhaust the non-exempt trusts in order to avoid a
45% GST tax at their deaths. Id.
212 Id. at 749.
205
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ing on the support needs of the income beneficiaries.213 The
lower court dismissed the daughters’ claim and they appealed.214
On appeal, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to
show that the current level of distributions was not sufficient to
maintain their accustomed standard of living.215 The court reasoned that as long as their needs were being met, the trustees did
not abuse their discretion by keeping the trust principal intact for
the benefit of the remainder beneficiaries.216
B. Discretionary Trusts
Modern trust instruments often authorize trustees to exercise broad discretion over the distribution of trust principal and
income.217 For example, a trustee may be given the power to
distribute income from the trust in unequal portions among a
group of beneficiaries. This is known as a spray trust. On the
other hand, a sprinkle trust allows a trustee to accumulate some
of the trust income instead of distributing it to the beneficiaries.218 In addition, a trustee may be authorized to invade the
corpus of the trust and distribute some or all of it to a particular
beneficiary.219 If the trust instrument provides some sort of standard to guide the trustee’s exercise of discretion, a court will find
that a trustee who has failed to follow the applicable standard is
guilty of an abuse of discretion.
However, if no standard is specified, the court will still uphold the validity of the trust as In re Estate of Ternansky illustrates.220 In that case, Rose Ternansky left two-thirds of her
estate outright to two of her children, Margaret and Florence.221
The remaining third was placed in trust for the benefit of her
third child, William.222 Florence was named as trustee for Wil213

Id.
Id.
215 Id. at 752.
216 Id. at 751-52.
217 Richard A. Ausness, Discretionary Trusts: An Update, 43 ACTEC L.J.
231, 238 (2018).
218 Id. at 239.
219 Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts,
61 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1426 (1961).
220 141 N.E.2d 189 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
221 Id. at 190.
222 Id.
214
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liam’s trust with uncontrolled discretion to distribute so much of
the trust’s assets to William as she “may deem advisable.”223
William filed objections to the final and distributive account of
his mother’s estate, essentially challenging the validity of the discretionary trust.224 However, William’s objections were overruled by the probate court and its decision was affirmed on
appeal, which upheld the validity of the trust even though Rose
provided no standard to guide Florence in the exercise of her
discretion as trustee.225 Although the court warned that the trustee would not be permitted to exercise his judgment from fraudulent, selfish, or other improper motives. The court also
declared that it would not attempt to control the trustee’s judgment as long as he acted in good faith to carry out the intention
of the settlor.226
The settlor may also give a trustee the discretion to terminate the trust prematurely. Thus, in Sully v. Sully,227 Frederick
Sully established a testamentary trust for his grandson, Robin,
that provided Robin would assume full control of the trust property when he reached the age of 35.228 However, the trust instrument also authorized the trustee, his uncle Thomas Scully,229 to
terminate the trust and distribute the trust assets to Robin at an
earlier age if he determined that Robin possessed sufficient experience, judgment, and prudence to manage the trust assets on his
own.230 When Robin reached the age of thirty, he brought suit
when Thomas refused to terminate the trust prematurely.231
The county court ruled that Thomas had not abused his discretion when he denied Robin’s request.232 However, the district
court reversed and ordered Thomas to terminate the trust and a
further appeal was taken.233 The Nebraska Supreme Court declared that a discretionary power vested in a trustee should not
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233

Id. at 191.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 191-92.
Id.
76 N.W.2d 239 (Neb. 1956).
Id. at 243.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 243.
Id. at 242-43.
Id. at 243.
Id.
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be disturbed by a court unless the trustee acted fraudulently or in
bad faith.234 The trust property consisted of large amounts of
real property located in Kansas, Louisiana, and Nebraska.235
Thomas presented evidence that Robin had done a poor job of
managing some of the family’s property for his father.236 Therefore, it concluded that Robin had failed to prove that Thomas
had abused his discretion when he refused to terminate the trust
prematurely.237
C. Decanting
Decanting occurs when a trustee who is given discretionary
power over distributions in the original trust exercises that option to distribute some or all of the trust property to a new trust
with updated provisions.238 The theory that supports trust decanting is that a settlor who gives the trustee the discretionary
power to make distributions from trust property implicitly gives
the trustee the right to make distributions in further trust. Unlike some other forms of trust modification, decanting does not
require court involvement. Decanting was first approved by a
court in Phipps v. Palm Beach Trust Co. in 1940.239 At present,
about half of the states have adopted statutes that expressly permit decanting but impose procedural and substantive safeguards
to protect the interests of beneficiaries. As Ferri v. Powell-Ferri
illustrates, decanting provides a trustee with the ability to respond quickly to changing conditions.240
In that case, John Paul Ferri, Sr. created an irrevocable inter
vivos trust in 1983 (the 1983 trust) for the benefit of his son, John
Paul Ferri, Jr. (John Jr.).241 John Jr.’s brother, Michael Ferri,
and Anthony Medaglia, were named as trustees.242 The trust
provided that once John Jr. reached the age of 35, he could withdraw principal from the trust in increasing amounts depending
234

Id. at 245.
Id. at 246.
236 Id. at 254
237 Id. at 254-55.
238 Lydia Lee Lockett & Peter Blumeyer, Sour Grapes: when Decanting
Gives Rise to Litigation, 33 PROB. & PROP. 26, 27 (Oct. 2019).
239 196 So. 299 (Fla. 1940).
240 116 A.3d 297 (Conn. 2015).
241 Id. at 300.
242 Id.
235
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on his age.243 In 2010, John Jr.’s wife, Nancy, filed for divorce.244
Fearing that Nancy would claim a share of the trust assets as marital property, the trustees transferred a substantial portion of the
trust assets to a new trust (the 2011 trust). John Jr. was the only
beneficiary of the 2011 trust, but the sole power to withdraw
property from the trust was vested in the trustees rather than in
John Jr.245 The trial court found that John Jr. played no role in
creating the 2011 trust or in transferring property from the 1983
trust to it.246
Shortly after the transfer of assets to the 2011 trust, the
trustees sought a declaratory judgment requesting the court to
acknowledge that they had validly exercised their power to transfer assets to the new trust and that John Jr. had no interest in the
trust that his spouse could reach in a divorce suit.247 The lower
court granted a summary judgment in favor of the trustees and
Nancy appealed.248
On appeal, Nancy argued that John Jr. had an affirmative
duty to protect their marital property by contesting the trustees’
action. The Connecticut Supreme Court acknowledged that a
spouse had a fiduciary duty not to waste marital property, as well
as a duty to disclose the existence of such property.249 However,
the court concluded that John Jr. had not breached any fiduciary
duty and that he had no duty to take affirmative steps to recover
marital assets from a third party.250 Consequently, the appellate
court affirmed the lower court’s judgment for the trustees.251
Decanting has also been used to transfer assets from a conventional trust or a support trust to a special needs trust.252 A
New York Surrogate’s Court upheld such a transfer in In re
243

Id. Michael testified that the 1983 trust was worth between $60 and $70
million. Id. at n.2.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 301.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 305.
251 Id. at 307.
252 Amy J. Fanzlaw, New Opportunity, to Decant in Florida, Part II: Successful Execution of Trust Decanting, 93 FLA. B.J. 22, 26 (Dec. 2019).

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MAT\34-1\MAT101.txt

Vol. 34, 2021

unknown

Seq: 29

11-JUN-21

Naming a Family Member as a Trustee

18:13

29

Kroll.253 The Kroll case involved a trust established in 1992 by
Moses Ratowsky for the benefit of his grandson, Daniel Schreiber.254 Daniel’s mother, Rachel, and Alan Kroll were named as
trustees.255 According to the trust, Daniel could receive income
or principal from the trust at the discretion of the trustees.256
However, Daniel would be entitled to withdraw all or any of the
trust principal once he reached the age of 21.257
Prior to Daniel’s 21st birthday, the trustees transferred the
trust’s assets to a new supplemental needs trust for the primary
benefit of Daniel.258 At the time, Daniel was suffering from disabilities and was receiving both Medicaid and SSI benefits.259 The
trustees then sought to have the surrogate court approve the
transfer.260 This request to decant was opposed by the New York
Attorney General acting on behalf of the Department of Health
which administered the state’s Medicaid program.261
The Attorney General argued because Daniel was entitled
to demand a distribution of principal once he reached the age of
21, the new trust would be considered a self-settled trust which
would have required a payback provision to reimburse the state
for medical expenses paid on Daniel’s behalf.262 However, the
court ruled that the trustees had complied with all of the statutory requirements for the effective exercise of the power of appointment contained in the original trust instrument.263
Therefore, the court concluded that the new trust was a valid
third-party supplemental needs trust and no payback provision
was required in the new trust.264

253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264

971 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Surr. Ct. 2013).
Id. at 864.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 865.
Id. at 866.
Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MAT\34-1\MAT101.txt

30

unknown

Seq: 30

11-JUN-21

18:13

Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers

IV. Precautionary Measures
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, appointing family
members to serve as trustees creates a risk of sparking ill will and
strife within the family. Even worse, disagreements about the
trustee’s decisions concerning administration of the trust or the
distribution of trust assets to particular beneficiaries may lead to
expensive and disruptive litigation among family members. It
appears that the best strategy for avoiding these situations is for
the settlor to appoint someone other than a family member to
serve as the trustee. In particular, it is risky to name the surviving spouse as trustee if some of the beneficiaries are not biological children of the spouse. In any event, if the settlor proposes to
nominate a family member as trustee who has no legal training,
the drafter should take steps to make sure the prospective trustee
is aware of the fiduciary duties associated with that office. However, if the settlor insists on appointing a family member to serve
as a trustee, there are some additional proactive measures that
the settlor and the prospective trustee can take to reduce the risk
of family discord in the future.
A better alternative might be to appoint a someone outside
the family as the trustee and name a family member as a trust
protector with the power to advise the trustee about trust administration and veto certain decisions about investments or the distribution of trust assets. The office of trust protector is a
relatively new addition to the law of trusts.265 Unlike a trustee, a
trust protector does not hold legal title to the trust property.
However, the trust instrument can give a trust protector power
over certain aspects of trust administration or the distribution of
trust assets. For example, trust protectors can advise the trustee,
oversee certain activities of the trustee such as investment decisions, resolving or mediating disputes between the trustee and
one or more beneficiaries, and modifying or terminating the
trust.266

265

Richard C. Ausness, When Is a Trust Protector a Fiduciary?, 27 QUINPROB. L.J. 277, 278-83 (2014).
266 Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Trust Protectors in American Trust
Law, 45 REAL PROP., TR. & EST. L.J. 319, 329 (2010).
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A. Actions by the Settlor (or the Drafter of the Trust
Instrument)
Regardless of whether the settlor wishes to have a family
member administer the trust, he or she should start by hiring a
professional estate planner to draft the trust instrument and carefully review the finished product. If the settlor is determined to
name a family member as the trustee, the prospect of disputes
among family members can be reduced by careful drafting. In
particular, the trust instrument should describe in detail the purpose of the trust, its distributive scheme, and the powers and duties of the trustee.
1. Purpose of the Trust
The trust instrument should clearly identify the purpose of
the trust. For example, the intended purpose may be to provide
for the financial security of the surviving spouse (and claim a
marital estate tax deduction), to provide for the financial security
of the settlor’s siblings, children, step-children, or grandchildren,
or to enable family members to retain control of a family farm or
business. The purpose of the trust can be further fleshed out in a
separate letter of intent addressed to the trustee which may be
shared with some or all of the beneficiaries.267
If the trust is discretionary, the trust instrument should indicate whether the trustee’s exercise of discretion is subject to an
ascertainable standard or whether it is “sole and unlimited” in
nature. Furthermore, if the settlor intends to provide support for
certain beneficiaries, the trust instrument should supplement the
usual boilerplate language with a more specific description of
what is included in the notion of support. For example, a provision for “comfortable maintenance, education, and support”
should indicate whether the term “education” includes postgraduate education or non-traditional alternatives such as study
at a performing art academy or a trade school. Finally, a support
trust should indicate whether the trustee should take a benefici267 For a discussion on the use of letters of intent, see Alexander A. Bove,
Jr., Commentary on Discretionary Trusts: An Update by Richard C. Ausness, 43
ACTEC L.J. 441, 445 ((2018); Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Letter of Wishes:
Can We Influence Discretion in Discretionary Trusts?, 35 ACTEC J. 38, 39
(2009).
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ary’s other resources into account when making decisions about
payments for support.
2. Powers and Duties of Trustees
Although trustees have certain inherent powers and duties
because of the nature of their office, it is better to identify these
powers and duties expressly instead of relying solely on judicial
decisions and statutory provisions.268 As far as powers are concerned, the powers listed in the Uniform Trust Code provide a
useful starting point. However, it would be helpful if the trust
instrument also spelled out the extent to which the trustee could
delegate certain functions to agents, such as financial advisors,
accountants, attorneys, and other agents. The trust instrument
should also make it clear whether the trustee is to be compensated for time spent administering the trust and also if the trustee
will be reimbursed for any money spent on trust business.269
In addition, the trust instrument should indicate whether the
trustee is to be relieved of the duty of impartiality, the duty of
prudence, the duty to avoid self-dealing, or the duty to avoid
conflicts of interest. This is especially important if the trustee is
also a trust beneficiary or if he or she has the power to make
discretionary distributions of trust income or principal. This step
is particularly important if the principal asset of the trust is real
property or shares in a family business. The settlor might also
consider whether to add an in terrorem clause or an exculpatory
clause to protect the trustee against questionable lawsuits by
other family members.
Another issue that the trust instrument should address is
how a successor trustee will be chosen if a trustee resigns, dies, or
becomes incompetent. Possible options include allowing the remaining trustees to choose a successor if multiple trustees have
been appointed, authorizing a corporate trustee to appoint individuals as successor trustees if there is a corporate trustee, and
finally the trust instrument could allow a trust protector to select
a successor trustee if the trust instrument provides for one.
268

The Uniform Trust enumerates a number of trustees’ powers and duties. UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 801-17.
269 The Uniform Trust Code for the reasonable compensation and reimbursement of trustees. UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 708-09.
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3. Distributive Framework
Obviously, the trust instrument should identify of all of the
potential beneficiaries and their respective rights in the trust. A
rigid distributive formula, such as “income in equal shares to A
and B,” has the advantage of reducing the grounds for a challenge to the trustee’s actions, but it could cause problems if unforeseen changes in circumstances affect a beneficiary’s needs. A
discretionary power to invade the trust corpus will increase flexibility, but it may encourage a challenge to the exercise of this
power from other beneficiaries. One response to this problem
would be to require unanimous consent to exercise a power to
invade if there are multiple trustees. Another solution might be
to require the consent of a trust protector to invade.
B. Actions by the Trustee
It is highly desirable, if not essential, for the trustee to maintain a good personal relationship with all of the beneficiaries.
This is particularly important if the trustee is also a family member. There are various steps that the trustee can take to encourage such relationships. For example, when the trustee
assumes office, he or she may convene a family conference to
inform family members about the purpose and provisions of the
trust. In addition, the trustee should encourage individual beneficiaries to discuss matters of concern with him or her. Furthermore, the trustee should make periodic disclosures about the
trust’s performance. Finally, the trustee should inform trust beneficiaries of any issues or events that may affect the trust.

V. Conclusion
A trustee’s life is often not a happy one. As the foregoing
discussion has shown, this is particularly true when a family
member is chosen to serve as a trustee. Consequently, it is generally a good idea for the settlor to appoint a non-family member,
such as a bank or corporate trustee, as trustee or co-trustee.
However, if the settlor insists on naming a family member as
trustee, there are some common-sense measures that the settlor
and the trustee can take to reduce the chances of friction within
the family. In particular, the settlor should make sure that the
trustee is fully aware of the fiduciary duties that are associated
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with the office of trustee. In addition, if possible, both the settlor and the trustee should inform other family members of the
general purposes of the trust and the trust provisions that directly
affect them. Hopefully, these measures will reduce the chances
of conflicts within the family after the settlor’s death.

